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INTERPRETING AN UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 
RoNALD D. RoTUNDA • 
It is frequently said in jest that one of the important things 
we share with the British is that we each live under an "unwrit-
ten Constitution." This point was well illustrated when a major 
casebook on American constitutional law was published with-
out reprinting the Constitution. 1 Some have suggested that 
perhaps the editors felt no need for law students to look at the 
Constitution because the Justices themselves seldom did. 
The "unwritten Constitution" encompasses those rights and 
freedoms thought by many people, particularly judges, to be 
basic to our democratic way of life, but which are not explicitly 
defined by the written document. While the Soviet Constitution 
expressly provides for rights of "guaranteed work, health pro-
tection, .[and] education, " 2 our Constitution reserves to the 
people a different class of rights. For instance, we may vote ir-
respective of race3 or gender,4 and we enjoy "the freedom of 
speech [and] of the press." 5 The people can then use the right 
to vote and the right of free speech and other rights, in con-
junction with the legislative process, to enact laws providing for 
such things as worker's compensation,6 medical payments,7 
public education, 8 and social security benefits 9 
* Profe~sor of Law, University of Illinois. 
J. Seej. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICY (1975). 
The first supplement to that edition and subsequent editions reprinted the 
Constitution. 
2. KoNST. SSSR c. 7, arts. 39-45 (USSR), reprinted in BASIC DocuMENTS ON THE So-
VIET LEGAL SYSTEM (W. Butler ed. & trans. 1983). 
3. U.S. CaNST. amend. XV,§ l. 
4. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIX, § l. 
5. U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
6. See, e.g., N.Y. WoRK. CaMP. LAW§§ 10-34 (McKinney 1988). 
7. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21,97 Stat. 65,65-
172, {codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (Supp. IV 1986)). 
8. See, e.g., The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
IO, 79 Stat. 27, 27-58 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986)). 
9. See, e.g., Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
460,98Stat.ll70, 1794-l814(codifiedasamendedat42U.S.C. §§ l381-I383c(l982 
& Supp. IV 1986)). 
16 Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12 
Our Constitution both establishes and limits government. 
Like the Mayflower Compact, 10 one part is structural in form. 
The system of "checks and balances," whereby one branch lim-
its and is limited by another, reflects eighteenth-century fasci-
nation with Newtonian scientific thought.'' The remainder of 
our Constitution is written in the "Thou shalt not" form, much 
like the Magna Carta. 12 This portion of the Constitution is the 
primary embodiment of enumerated rights, including the pro-
hibition that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion," 13 and the guarantee that no person shall 
"be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." 14 The list is well known. The Supreme Court, when it 
attempts to interpret the Constitution, has at its disposal these 
and other enumerated rights phrased in magnificent generali-
ties. Why is it necessary, then, for the Court to look to an "un-
written Constitution"? And, if the Court does turn to an 
unwritten Constitution, will it be worth the paper it is printed 
on? 
For much of its history, the Supreme Court has purportedly 
engaged in "interpretive" judicial review. 15 Interpretive review 
occurs when the Court 
ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by 
reference to one of the value judgments of which the Consti-
tution consists-that is, by reference to a value judgment 
10. The Compact provides: 
We whose names are underwritten . . do by these presents, solemnly and 
mutually, in the presence of God and one of another, covenant, and combine 
ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preser-
vation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, 
constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, 
offices from time to time as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the 
general good of the Colony; unto which we promise all due submission and 
obedience. 
The Mayflower Compact, reprinted in THE MAYFLOWER CoMPACT AND ITs SIGNERS 6 (G. 
Bowman 1920). 
II. Woodrow Wilson likened the balance of "checks and coumerpoises" to a system 
"which Newton might readily have recognized as suggestive of the mechanism of the 
heavens." W. WILSON, CoNSTlTUTJONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908). 
12. For example, a provision of the Magna Carta provides, "No man shall be com~ 
pelled to perform more service for a knight's fee or for any other free tenement than is 
due therefrom." Magna Carta c. 16, reprinted in]. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323 (1965). 
13. U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
15. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) ("It is, em-
phatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what. the law is. 
Those who apply the rule for particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule."); see alw J GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS To 1801 at 554-68, 580-84 (1971). 
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embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in some 
particular provision of the text of the Constitution or in 
the overall structure of government ordained by the 
Constitution. 16 
17 
Even prominent non-interpretivists have acknowledged that 
the legitimacy of interpretive review is quite easily justified. 17 
However, in recent years a growing number of commenta-
tors have urged the courts to rely on non-interpretive values in 
deciding cases of constitutional law. 18 The justification for non-
interpretive review is more troublesome. Its proponents posit 
cheerfully that judges should adopt values not found in, influ-
enced by, or derived from the constitutional text or the logic of 
precedent1 9 These advocates would blithely grant the courts 
unbridled power, arguing that the judiciary is "the voice and 
conscience of contemporary society."20 In this "more candidly 
creative role,"21 judges find the "right answers" from appropri-
ate moral and political values in order to go "beyond the value 
judgments established by the framers of the written Constitu-
tion (extraconstitutional policymaking) ."22 The Constitution is 
no longer viewed as a blueprint for allocating and limiting gov-
ernment power; rather, judicial review is simply a tool that 
judges use to forge an ideal society-or at least what these 
judges view as an ideal society. Thus, "the highest mission of 
the Supreme Court ... is not to conserve judicial credibility, 
but in the Constitution's own phrase, 'to form a more perfect 
Union.' " 23 
When judges look outside the Constitution, they ultimately 
look inside themselves. To illustrate this abstract principle, let 
16. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTfON, THE Cot:RTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE jUDICIARY 10 (1982) 
(footnote omitted); see also Palmer, The Fedeml Common Law ofChme, 4 L. & HrsT. REV. 
267, 269 (1986); 2 R. RoTUNDA, N. NoWAK, &J. YouNG, TREATISE oN CoNSTITUTWNAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§§ 23.1-23.38 (1986). 
17. SeeM. PERRY, supra note 16, at II, "No contemporary constitutional theorist seri-
ously disputes the leg·irimacy of interpretive review." Moreover, Perry has admitted 
that "[c]ertainly [non-interpretive review] cannot bejustifted on the basis of either the 
constitutional text or the intentions of the framers." !d. at 43. 
18. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 16. 
19. See id.; see also infra notes 20-21. 
. 20. The excerpt is from a court brief mentioned in an artide by then Associate Jus-
ttce William Rehnquist. See Rehnquist, The Xotion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. LREV. 
693, 695 (1976); see also R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977); Parker, The 
Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. LJ. 223 (1981). 
2!. L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (lst ed. !978). 
22. M. PERRY, sujJra note 16, at ix-x (emphasis omit.ted)·, see also id. at 101-14. 
23. L. TRIBE., w.pm note 21, at iv. 
18 Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12 
us consider a specific case, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connect-
icut.24 In that case a strongly divided Court (five to four) invali-
dated a state law to the extent that it conflicted with a 
Connecticut Republican Party rule that permitted independent 
voters to vote in Republican primaries for federal and state-
wide offices. The state law provided for a closed primary; the 
Republican party rules provided for an open primary for fed-
eral and state-wide offices but a closed primary for other offices 
(e.g., state legislator, mayor). 25 The state law providing for a 
closed primary was hardly unusual or restrictive; it allowed a 
previously unaffiliated voter to become eligible to vote in the 
Party's primary simply by enrolling as a Party member as late as 
noon on the last business day preceding the primary26 
Why did the Party reject the state law and draw such peculiar 
distinctions? The opinions in Tashjian do not disclose what mo-
tivated this unique party rule. However, searching deep in the 
lower court record, we learn that the Republican United States 
Senator from Connecticut was concerned that he would not 
win his party's primary without an influx of non-Republican 
voters. Because other Republican candidates did not want in-
dependents voting in their primary, a compromise rule limited 
independent voting to statewide offices. 27 
Out of such prosaic concerns, the Supreme Court majority 
fashions a new constitutional right of a political party. This 
right was not easily created, because it appeared to conflict with 
earlier precedent. In 1976 a three-judge court had upheld the 
very same Connecticut dosed-primary law when an independ-
ent voter sought a declaratory judgment that he had a right to 
vote in the Republican primary. The Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed that decision in Nader v. Schajfer28 
The Tashjian Court specifically approved Schaffer's enforce-
ment of the slate's dosed primary statute29 , but Justice Mar-
shall, for the Court, distinguished the earlier case on the 
ground that it was brought by independent voters, not by the 
24. 479 u.s. 208 (1986). 
25. /d. at 211 nn.l-2. 
26. !d. at 216 n.7. 
27. The plaintiffs admitted this fact. See 3 R. RoTUNDA,]. NoWAK, &.J. YouNG, TREA-
TISE oN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: SuBsTANCE & PRoCEDURE§ 20.41, at 22 (Supp. 1988). 
28. 429 U.S. 989 (l976), summarily afl'g 417 F. Supp. 837 (D.Conn. 1976). 
29. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 212. 
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Republican Party30 The Tashjian Court reasoned that in Schaffer 
"the non-member's desire to participate in the party's affairs is 
overborne by the countervailing and legitimate right of the 
party to determine its own membership qualifications."31 Thus 
it was of constitutional dimension that the Republican Party it-
self objected to the state law. The Court concluded that the 
Connecticut law at issue in Tashjian 
impermissibly burdens the right of [Party] members to de-
termine for themselves with whom they will associate, and 
whose support they will seek, in their quest for political suc-
cess. The Party's attempt to broaden the base of public 
participation in and support for its activities is conduct unde-
niably central to the exercise of the right of association.32 
The Court cited no constitutional provision supporting this 
surprising conclusion. 33 Could a political party exclude blacks 
in an effort to pursue its political goals? The majority did say 
that the members of a political party have a constitutional right 
"to determine for themselves with whom they will associate," 
but surely it did not mean exactly that. 
Justice Marshall found that "[t]he Party's determination of 
the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure 
which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by 
the Constitution." 34 Because he eoncluded that "[t]he interests 
which the [state] adduces in support of the statute are insub-
stantial" and not "compelling,"35 the Court declared the stat-
ute, as applied to the party, unconstitutional. 
l believe in freedom of association just as much as the next 
person. It is a right derived easily fi·om the First Amendment. 
The leading case in the area is Roberts v. United States jaycees, 36 
which affirmed state power to regulate large non-intimate as-
sociations, while recognizing that the power diminishes as the 
30. !d. at 215-16 n.6. 
31. !d. 
32. !d. at 215-16. 
33. The Court did recognize, of course, the freedom of association implied from the 
First Amendment when it noted that "the freedom to join together in furtherance of 
common political beliefs 'necessarily presupposes the freedom 10 identify the people 
who constitute the association,'" thereby implicating the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. !d. at 214 (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 
107, 122 (1981)). But the Schaffer decision had not rejected the right of freedom of 
association, and it approved of the dosed-primary law. 
34. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224. He also argued, somewhat inconsistently, that the act 
of registering as a Republican was a significant public act of affiliation. See id. at n. 7. 
35. /d. at 225. 
36. 468 u.s. 609 (1984). 
20 Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12 
association becomes more private-'7 Significantly, the Tashjian 
Court never cited Roberts. Had the Tashjian Court applied the 
Roberts rationale, it would have upheld the constitutionality of 
the Connecticut statute as a permissible state regulation of a 
large, non-intimate association. A state-wide or national party 
is hardly an intimate association like marriage. In fact, the 
Court has approved of many instances in which states have le-
gitimately regulated political parties in an effort to maintain a 
democratic balance. 38 The majority did not distinguish, or even 
37. The Roberts decision involved two Minnesota chapters of the United States 
Jaycees, which had incurred sanctions and faced revocation of their charters because 
they admitted women contrary to the national governing bylaws. The chapters filed 
discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, alleging that 
the exclusion of women from full membership violated the state Human Rights Act, 
which made it an "unfair discriminatory practice ... [t]o deny any person the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
comodation.s of a place of public accomodation because of race, color, creed, religion, 
disability, national origin, or sex." 468 U.S. at 615. 
In finding the Act constitutional as applied to the Jaycees, the Court stated: 
[T]he Bill of Rights ... must afford the formation and preservation of certain 
kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from 
unjustified interference by the State . 
. . . fO]nly relationships with lintimar.e] qualities are likely to reflect the con* 
siderations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an 
intrinsic element of personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these 
qualities-such as a large business enterprise-seems remote from r.he con· 
cerns giving rise to this constiLUtional protection. Accordingly, the Constitu· 
tion undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the 
selection of one's spouse that would not. apply to regulations affecting the 
choice of one's fellow employees. 
Jd. at 618·20 (citations omitted). 
38. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (California one-year disaffiliation 
statute held constitut.ional as furthering State's interest in promoting stability and dis-
couraging confusion in the political system); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 
(1973) (New York election law requiring party enrollment prior to general election in 
order to vote in subsequent party primary, held constitutional as least restrictive means 
of preventing raiding). But see Anderson v. Celebreue, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (Ohio stat· 
ute requiring independent candidate for President to file petition and statement of can· 
didacy at calculated date prior to primary in order to appear on later general election 
ballot, held unconstitutional as burdening association rights of candidate and support· 
ers, against asserted State interest of maintaining political stability); Democratic Party 
of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (Wisconsin electoral statute man· 
dating results of primary determine allOcation of votes cast by state's delegates at Na-
tional Convention, contrary to party's own rules, held violative of Constitution 
notwithstanding State's asserted compelling interests of preserving oyerall integrity of 
electoral process, secrecy in balloting, and increased voter participation); Kusper v. 
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (Jllinois voting statute held to unconstitutionally infringe 
First Amendment by locking voter in pre-existing party affiliation for 23·month period 
following participation in any primary election, despite state's asserted legitimate inter· 
est in preventing raiding); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Ohio election law 
rendering nearly impossible ballot qualification of any party other than Democratic or 
Republican held violative of equal protection, despite the claimed state interest in pro-
moting two-party system, encourag-ing political stability and compromise, and control· 
ling multitudinous ffagmentary groups). 
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mention, either Roberts or other cases upholding such regula-
tion. As the dissent pointed out: 
Connecticut may lawfully require that significant elements of 
the democratic election process be democratic-whether the 
Party wants that or not. It is beyond my understanding why 
the Republican Party's delegation of its democratic choice to 
the Republican Convention can be proscribed, but its dele-
gation of that choice to nonmembers of the Party cannot. 39 
Tashjian is but one example of a majority of the Court aban-
doning the written Constitution, turning instead to the "un-
written Constitution" and the Justices' own view of good 
policy40 Maybe the case could have been grounded in the Con-
stitution and precedent, but the majority made no effort to do 
so. 
Even proponents of a "natural law" theory of the Constitu-
tion appreciate that there must be some limitations to judicial 
power. If the Constitution does not provide those bounds, 
something else must. Professor Michael Perry, a leading non-
interpretivist, has argued that these parameters exist in a lim-
ited power of Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
courts." 1 Yet once Congress exercises a statutory power to 
overrule in effect constitutional decisions by restricting juris-
diction, have we not gone a long way towards weakening judi-
cial review?42 Once Congress drinks of such powers, I fear that 
39. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215~6 n.6 (Scalia, J, dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ., 
and O'Connor, J). The dissent added: 
Appellee's only complaint is that the Party cannot leave the seleClion of its 
candidates to person.s who are not members of the Pan.y, and are unwilling to 
become members. It seems to me fanciful to refer to this as an interest in 
freedom of association between the members of the Republican Party and the 
putative independent voters .... [Moreover,] even if it were the fact that the 
majority of the Party's members wanted its candidates to be determined by 
OU(siders, there is no reason why the State is bound to honor that desire- any 
more than it would be bound to honor a party's democratically expressed de-
sire that its candidates henceforth be selected by convention rather than by 
primary, or by the party's executive committee in a smoke-filled room. 
!d. at 235-7 (emphasis in original). 
40. Even conservative Courts have created new rights from the "unwritten Constitu-
tion." See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915); Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 
(1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (l897). 
41. SeeM. PERRY, supra note !6, at 128-38. 
42. Professor Strong has suggested this point. See Strong, Foreboding Fissures in the 
Bedrock of Popular Sovereignty, 59 No. CAR. L. REv. 599, 603 n. 21 (1981). On the power 
of Congress to control the jurisdinion of the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts, and the constitutional limitations on that power, see 1 R. ROTUNDA,]. NowAK, & 
j. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE§§ 2.10-2.11 
(1986). 
22 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. !2 
it will act like the little boy who said that he knew how to spell 
"banana," but did not know when to stop. 
:Several years ago, Justice William Brennan urged, 'Justices 
are not platonic guardians appointed to wield authority accord-
ing to their personal moral predilections."43 Even earlier, Jus-
tice Hugo Black warned us that when the Justices stray from the 
written Constitution and rely on "natural rights," they "de-
grade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and 
simultaneously appropriate for this Court a broad power which 
we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise."44 It is 
surprising that, in today's climate, these sentiments are consid-
ered controversiaL 
Some time ago, a Peanuts comic strip showed Snoopy, the 
dog, looking at Charlie Brown and Linus. Snoopy thinks to 
himself: "I wonder why some of us are born dogs and others 
are born people. Is it just chance, or what is it? Somehow the 
whole thing just seems unfair." Then Snoopy concludes: "Why 
should I have been the lucky one?" 
That is a question we should ask. Why are we the lucky ones? 
We have been very fortunate to have a Supreme Court to help 
preserve our constitutional rights. Hopefully, our luck will hold 
out. We all recognize that the Court has sometimes engaged in 
excesses. Nevertheless, this nation is 'fortunate to have a 
Supreme Court that is the final arbiter acting to preserve our 
constitutional rights. Academic commentary should be acting 
to divert the Court away from the uncharted expanse of the 
"unwritten Constitution." Unfortunately, the pressure of much 
current academic commentary is in exactly the opposite direc-
tion. That is not good for the long-term health of the Court. 
We will not always be the lucky ones. 
43. Justice William Brennan, quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 36, col. 2. 
44. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,70 (1947) (Black,J,joined by Douglas,]., 
dissenting); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76-87 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
